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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we employ the discrete-time duration model to examine whether expansion 
and contraction phases of government revenue exhibit duration dependence. We hence use 
an unbalanced panel data of public revenue on 68 developing countries over the period 
1980-2009. The analysis also covers the sub-samples of sub-Saharan African and Non sub-
Saharan African countries. Our findings suggest that once controlling for frailty and 
economic variables, the likelihood of public revenue expansion and contraction ending 
appears to be positively affected by their actual age: government revenue expansion and 
contraction exhibit in developing countries positive duration dependence.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
In today’s world, fiscal policy is more than ever a key development policy tool. 
Developing and low-income countries require considerable mobilization of revenue to attain 
their development objectives. Many studies have examined the nature of the determinants of 
public revenue and their effect on macroeconomic indicators (e.g. for private consumption, 
private investment, or economic growth). However, to our knowledge, none of them has 
explored the issue of the duration of government revenue cycle phases, namely public revenue 
expansion and contraction. The purpose of this paper is to use ‘survival’, ‘duration’ or 
‘hazards’ analysis to explore whether public revenue expansion/contraction in developing 
countries exhibits duration dependence. This kind of analysis is required to study the length of 
time spent by individuals within some state. It models the phenomenon of ‘time to event’ or 
‘time failure’, which is also known as ‘spell length’. Duration analysis has often been used in 
labour economics to study the duration of periods of unemployment (see for example, Allison, 
1982). It has also recently been used to explore issues such as the duration of business cycle 
expansions and contractions (see. Castro, 2010), or international trade issues such as the 
duration of EU’s imports (Hess et al., 2010).  
‘Duration’ in this study refers to the number of years during which government 
revenue in a developing country remains either in the expansion or in contraction phases. The 
overall goal is to estimate the hazard rate, i.e the probability at which the stay in a given phase 
of government revenue cycle (expansion or contraction) ends at time t after a country stays in 
that category until t.  
This paper explores various key areas of interest. Firstly, we need to determine how 
the hazard rate varies with the time spells (duration dependence effect) and with the values of 
relevant covariates, having controlled for the heterogeneity that may stem from country 
characteristics. Secondly, we will focus both on our full sample of developing countries as 
well as on the sub-samples of sub-saharan African countries and non sub-Saharan African 
countries, in order to evaluate whether they exhibit different patterns regarding hazard rate 
and duration dependence. The hypothesis of state-dependence or path-dependence (see 
Eblbers, and Ridder, 1982; Heckman 1991; Parsley and Wei, 1993) implies that repeated 
failures in the expansion or contraction of public revenue, especially over a relatively long 
period, may build up a positive/negative reputation (i.e it signals some deeply rooted 
conditions that are favorable or unfavorable to expansions or contractions). According to 
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Heckman (1981), ‘true state dependence1’ means that the experience of a phase of expansion 
or contraction of government revenue in any one year raises the risk of being in the same 
phase in the next year. However, rather than indicating true state dependence, the duration 
dependence observed in the data may be explained by certain ‘unfavourable’ characteristics 
(both observable and unobservable) that justify why certain developing countries leave the 
phase of expansion earlier or stay longer in the phase of contraction of government revenue 
(this is known as the ‘sorting effect’). Accordingly, the duration of government revenue 
phases of expansion/contraction may be unrelated to the hazard rate of government revenue 
expansion or contraction. In such cases, the observed relationship between the hazard rate and 
the duration of expansions or contractions of government revenue is likely to be spurious and 
may indirectly hide other causalities (see also Andriopoulou et al., 2011). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 places the paper in the context of 
existing literature. In Section 3, we explain how we date the phases of public revenue cycles, 
indicating how we identify peaks and troughs in our dataset. Section 4 outlines the empirical 
approach whereas section 5, evaluates the empirical results. Section 6 is the conclusion.  
    
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The determinants of tax revenues in developing countries have been largely explored in the 
empirical literature. The latter broadly encompasses two main strands. The first strand 
explores the determinants of tax revenue (or global public revenue) by using cross-section 
frameworks and ignoring the variation over time. This includes the work of Lotz and Morss 
(1967), Bahl (1971), Chelliah (1971), Chelliah, Baas and Kelly (1975), Tait Eichengreen and 
Gratz (1979), Tanzi (1992) and Bird, Martinez-Vasquez and Torgler (2004). The second 
strand of the empirical literature introduces the time dimension and includes studies that 
examine the determinants of tax revenue over time. Among these works are those of Tanzi 
(1981), Leuthold (1991), Stotsky and WoldeMariam (1997), Ghura (1998), Stostky et al. 
(2004), Adam, Bevan and Chambas (2001), Gupta (2007), Chambas et al. (2008) and Brun et 
al (2011). Most of these studies, in examining the determinants of tax revenues, also construct 
a measure of tax effort. Other studies focus more particularly on how tax revenues respond to 
                                                          
1
 Precisely, the term «state dependence» is used in order to define the dependence of the status in t on the status 
of the dependent variable in t-1, while the term “duration dependence” expresses the dependence of the status in 
t on the duration spent in this status. Yet the two terms are often used as synonyms in the literature. In this paper, 
we focus on duration dependence but, indirectly, state dependence is also examined.   
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business cycles. For example, Velloso and Xing (2010) have recently examined the 
relationship between tax revenue efficiency and the output gap. Their results suggest a 
positive and significant effect of these variables, results that are consistent for both advanced 
and developing countries and for both quarterly and annual data. In addition, during booms, 
the short run elasticity of tax revenue to output is higher than the long-run elasticity, 
suggesting that policymakers need to look beyond simple, long-run revenue elasticities and 
incorporate into their analysis the effects of the economic cycle on tax revenue efficiency, 
particularly during major economic booms and downturns. Gavin and Perotti (1997) also 
show evidence that fiscal policy is procyclical in Latin American countries and contracyclical 
in industrial countries. More specifically, they find evidence that a one-percentage-point 
increase in the rate of output growth in industrial countries is associated with an increase in 
the fiscal surplus of about 0.37 percentage points of GDP, whereas the fiscal response in Latin 
American countries appears to be negligible (that is, not statistically significant). They also 
explore the nature of fiscal policy in Latin America and industrial countries during good and 
bad times. Their findings are of two kinds: 
-a major asymmetry is found in the fiscal response to output shocks in industrial 
countries: during good times, budget surplus increases with GDP growth, whereas the 
magnitude of the positive response of fiscal deficit during bad times is higher - 
recessions are economically and/or politically more costly than output booms, and the 
fiscal policy response to them thus needs to be stronger.  
 -for Latin American countries, the fiscal balance responds positively and significantly 
to a severe decline of real GDP growth (by more than 10%). 
Another study of IMF (2005) also finds empirical evidence for the procyclicality of 
fiscal policy in advanced, emerging and developing countries. The authors observe evidence 
that in emerging and developing countries, a one percentage increase in the output gap is 
associated with a deterioration of cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance by 0.5 percentage point of 
GDP, whereas the deterioration is of 0.2 percentage point of GDP in advanced countries. In a 
similar vein, Kun Li and Pablo Lopez-Murphy (2010) examine how imports affect tax 
revenue downturns in advanced, emerging and developing countries. They argue that positive 
changes in import-to-GDP ratio are associated with increases in tax revenue-to-GDP ratio. 
This result is valid for the different groups of countries (advanced, emerging and developing 
countries) used in their study. In addition, for all these groups of countries, there seems to be 
no significant response to changes in tax revenues-to-GDP ratio to real GDP growth during 
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bad times. Moreover, an increase in real GDP growth in emerging and developing countries 
induces a positive change of tax revenue-to-GDP ratio. This effect is not statistically 
significant for advanced economies. This study is influenced by the work of Gavin and Perotti 
(1997) and Kun Li and Pablo Lopez-Murphy (2010) and explores whether public revenue 
expansions and contractions exhibit duration dependence. In the next section, we explain how 
we date the public revenue phases of expansions and contractions. 
 
3. DATING THE PHASES OF PUBLIC REVENUE EXPANSION AND 
CONTRACTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The identification of specific cycles in economic time series requires precise 
definitions of expansion and contraction (Cashin 2004). This applies to government revenues 
in developing countries. According to Harding and Pagan (2002), any procedure or algorithm 
for extrema identification should follow three fundamental criteria: determining a set of 
potential turning points; ensuring alternance between maxima and minima; following a set of 
rules that satisfy the pre-determined criteria of duration and magnitude of phases and cycles, 
that is, the censoring rules. 
The literature on business cycle offers several approaches for identifying the turning 
points in ‘classical cycles’. The most frequently one used is that of the NBER, as developed 
by Bry and Boschian2 (BB) (1971). His algorithm evolved from the NBER dating of cycles in 
U.S. economic activity and has been further adapted by scholars such as King and Plosser 
(1994), Watson (1994) and Harding and Pagan (2002a). It is worth mentioning that Pagan 
(1999) has also applied the algorithm to date bull and bear markets in equity prices, and 
Cashin, McDermott and Scott (2002) have applied it to dating commodity-price cycles.  
The empirical literature distinguishes between ‘classical cycles’ and ‘growth cycles’. 
The former refers to series in level whereas the latter examines series’ deviations from trends 
(Stock and Watson, 1999). Accordingly, the appropriate dating method needs to be chosen, 
depending on the objectives the researcher is pursuing.  
Cashin (2004), in exploring the key features of Caribbean business cycles during the 
annual period 1963-2003, has used a number of criteria for both classical cycles and growth 
                                                          
2
 The BB procedure essentially identifies the turning points of high frequency series, generally the monthly data 
of GDP, based on the classical definition of cycle proposed by Burns and Mitchell (1946). Other criteria based 
on the frequency of the series (the quarterly version of BB’s algorithm) and on Okun’s rule (any contraction 
should have a minimum duration of 2 quarters) are also employed (Massmann et al., 2003). 
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cycles to identify peaks and troughs. For the purpose of this study, we will adapt Cashin 
(2004)’s method of dating the peaks and troughs of government revenue cycle in developing 
countries. In particular, we adopt the ‘classical growth’ method for dating government 
revenue expansions and contractions in developing countries for two reasons: firstly, it is the 
most appropriate technique for our study and secondly, results based on the ‘growth cycle’ 
technique are sensitive to the chosen de-trending method (Canova, 1998). We will rely on 
these two definitions:    
Definition 1: For annual data, an expansion is defined as a sequence of increases in the 
government revenue-to-GDP ratio and a contraction, as a sequence of decreases in the 
government revenue-to-GDP ratio. 
Definition 2: A cycle includes one expansion and one contraction, each of them having 
a minimum of one year. 
We will follow Cashin and McDermott (2002) and Cashin (2004) in ruling out any 
mild interruptions in expansions or contraction. More particularly, we do not consider any 
potential change of phase that moves the cycle by less than one half of one per cent per year 
as a turning point. The use of ‘classical cycles” leads us to consider expansions/contractions 
as periods of absolute rise/decline in the global public revenues-to-GDP ratio, rather than as 
periods of below-trend (above-trend) growth in the series (which is the definition of a “growth 
cycle”).  
Therefore, we can identify the dates of different peaks and troughs for developing 
countries’ government revenue-to-GDP ratio phases of expansion and contraction. Our panel 
dataset is unbalanced, comprising 68 developing countries (of which 42 are Sub-Saharan 
African countries) and covers the period 1980-2009. The choice of that period was dictated by 
data availability. For practical reasons, we chose to focus on countries in which the minimum 
availability of annual data about government revenue is 26 years. That choice is justified by 
the fact that ‘the smaller the samples, the lower are the number of cycles to be identified, 
making the results obtained by the identification technique used more sensitive, thus 
rendering any statistical inference practically impossible (Abad and Quilis, 1998). Camacho et 
al. (2004) also highlight the difficulties in properly identifying the turning points at the 
beginning and the end of the period of study, on very small samples, with the possible 
consequence of losing important information. In the table 1, we provide standard descriptive 
statistics on the duration of expansion/contraction for each country in our sample.  
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It is necessary to point out the importance here of the phenomenon of the ‘censoring’ 
of spells. Survival analysis which based on spell analysis can suffer from left and right 
censoring, meaning that certain spells start before and finish after the period of study. This is 
referred to as the left and right censoring status. According to Jenkins (2005), a survival time 
is censored if all that is known is that it began or ended within some particular interval of 
time, and thus the total spell length (from entry time until transition) is not known exactly.  
The
 
right censored spells refers to a spell that does not end within the observation period, 
whereas the left-censored ones refer to those that have started prior to the beginning date 
(here, the year) of the observation period and for which the exact length is unknown. In 
empirical duration analysis, left-censored spells are not taken into account to avoid any 
restrictive a priori assumption about the duration dependence of the hazard rate. However, 
these right-censored spells do not matter for the derivation of the sample likelihood. This is 
why we include in our analysis all right-censored spells, but disregard left-censored spells. 
With regard to descriptive statistics tables, in table 1, we report the period of study 
(minimum of 26 years and maximum of 30 years), the number of expansions and contractions 
spells (where we exclude the spurious points and the left-censoring spells but include the 
right-censoring ones), and finally the peaks and troughs. In table 2, we provide the mean, the 
standard deviation, the minimum and the maximum duration of the expansion and contraction 
of global public revenue-to-GDP ratio. Regarding the latter, the maximum duration of 
expansion is 9 years for both the full sample of developing countries and the sub-sample of 
sub-Saharan African countries (henceforth referred to as SSA) and 7 years for non sub-
Saharan African countries (henceforth referred to as Non SSA). The maximum duration of 
contraction is 8 years for both the full sample of developing countries and the sub-sample of 
SSA and 7 years for the sub-sample of Non SSA. 
A more thorough descriptive analysis is shown in, table 2, which presents descriptive 
statistics for the durations of public revenue expansion/contraction, while making a distinction 
between complete and ongoing (incomplete) spells, over the observed period, and figures 1 
and 2 plot descriptive survivor functions for the distribution of expansion and contraction 
duration. From table 2, it appears that in our dataset, all countries do not exhibit an incomplete 
spell of expansion/contraction. In addition, considering the full sample, we can observe that, 
on average, complete expansion spells last longer than contraction spells while incomplete 
contraction spells last more than incomplete expansion spells. The average length of 
expansion duration appears to be higher than that of contraction duration for the sub-samples 
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of SSA and Non SSA. In terms of duration variability, spells of expansions and contraction 
display roughly the same standard deviation as the full sample in developing countries, while 
the variability of these spells (except complete ones) is higher in Non SSA than in SSA.  
In figures 1 and 2, we analyze the survivor function of public revenue expansion and 
contraction duration. Hence, we plot the observed spell lengths in the x-axis and the fraction 
of observations where the observed spell of expansion/contraction exceeds a given length in 
the y-axis. Figure 1 suggests that, in developing countries, approximately 44% of all spells of 
expansion cease during the first year and 87% terminate within the first three years, while 
52.9% of all contraction spells terminate during the first year and, 94.44% of all contraction 
spells end within the first three years. As regards to our two sub-samples, we can observe that 
the number of expansions spells that cease during the first year in Sub-Saharan African 
countries (47.1%) is higher than that of non Sub-Saharan African countries (37.7%). The 
opposite is true for contraction spells (52.29% versus 53.95%). In addition, the number of 
expansions spells that terminate within the first three years is higher in SSA (89.96%) than in 
non SSA (81.88%), whereas in the case of contraction, an opposite relationship (96.18% 
versus 91.45%) can be observed. Therefore, we can conclude that many spells of expansion or 
contractions last a few years, while a few are ‘long-lasting’. Thus, the expansion and 
contraction of government revenue are often very short-lived.       
 
4. EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
4.1 The choice of the model framework: discrete-time or continuous time?  
In this section, we lay out the econometric model of the duration of expansions and 
contractions of government revenue. In duration models, the key issue is the ‘hazard rate’, 
which is the probability of experiencing an event (here, expansions or contractions in 
government revenue) after a certain number of years, which is conditional on not having had 
experience of the event up to that time. Therefore, in analyzing whether the 
expansion/contraction of government revenues in developing countries exhibits duration 
dependence patterns, we need to examine whether the probability of public revenue 
expansion/contraction duration ending in developing countries depends on the amount of time 
spent within that spell. The duration variable is then defined as the number of periods (here, 
years) that a country experiences in a state of expansion or contraction, depending on the 
phase which is being analyzed. This variable is in our case, continuous. However, the 
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information is available only annually. We have thus grouped (or banded) data and the 
discrete hazard model should be used. The adoption of this discrete-time framework is based 
on the fact that whereas duration models have initially been conceived in terms of continuous 
time-setting, some authors, (e.g. Ohn et al. 2004; Castro 2010, Hess et al., 2011) argue that 
discrete-time setting is more appropriate when the minimum duration of phases is a small 
multiple of the reference time unit (a quarter) – which is in fact the case here, as we have 
annual data. Furthermore, discrete-time duration models have the following advantages: 
- they easily allow the inclusion of time-varying covariates within the framework as 
well as accounting for unobserved individual heterogeneity, even if the number of 
observations is large. 
- they can allow us to easily circumvent the restrictive assumptions of proportional 
hazards.   
Accordingly, in this study, we use parametric discrete-time duration models to 
examine whether government revenue in phases of expansion or contraction in developing 
countries produces duration dependence. The work of Jenkins (1995, 2005), Castro (2010), 
Greene (2003) and Hess et al. (2011) is referenced in relation to this. 
One important issue when analyzing discrete-time models is that of spells 
independence. In order to obtain consistent parameter estimates from our regression, spells 
must be independent. Also, censoring must occur only at interval boundaries, and must not 
provide any information about iT  beyond that available in the covariates (see. Hess et al., 
2010; Jenkins, 1995). Hence, to ensure conditional independence between spells, we need to 
account for multiple spells as well as for the dependencies existing among 
expansions/contractions of government revenue in the same country. 
In the next sub-section, we will discuss practical issues related to the implementation 
of discrete-time models. 
    
4.2 Discussion of the practical issues related to the implementation of the 
discrete-time method 
To estimating the hazard rate of a country’s government revenue 
expansion/contraction, we are confronted with four main challenges:  
- the choice of the covariates entering the model;  
- the choice of the functional form of the hazard rate itP ;  
- the choice of the functional form of the baseline hazard rate; and  
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- the choice of whether or not to include unobserved heterogeneity in the model and 
if so, the choice of the distribution of that ‘frailty’.  
We will now examine each of these challenges. 
4.2.1 The first challenge : Choosing the covariates entering the model 
The first challenge is to choose the covariates entering the model. In appendices A and 
B we provide an overview of all variables, data sources and a list of countries used in our 
analysis. 
 
 The dependent variable 
To implement our estimation in Stata, as recommended by Jenkins (1995, 2005) for 
survival analysis, we need to reorganize our data structure in a person-period format3. 
Accordingly, we will create the following variables: 
 t indicates the time periods the country is at risk or the length of the spell – number of 
periods - at which the country experiences government revenue expansion/contraction. 
 y is a binary dependent variable, which is equal to 1 if the observed spell i ended 
during the tth year, and 0 otherwise. This variable is often referred to as censoring status. 
Indeed, as mentioned above (in section 3), we can observe for each spell of government 
revenue expansion/contraction, the last year in which it occurs, but not necessary the first year 
it has started. Note however that the terminal period may differ across spells (see table 1). In 
addition, for the countries that experience several expansions or contractions of government 
revenue over the observed period, we have the so called ‘repeated spells’ or ‘multi-failure’ 
data. These spells may lead to violations of assumptions about homoscedasticity. To obtain 
robust standard errors, we need to use inter group correlation for specific countries  
 
 The explanatory variables   
We follow Gavin and Perotti (1997)’s model in which changes in fiscal outcomes (in 
percent of GDP) are explained by real GDP growth, terms of trade growth, and lagged fiscal 
outcomes, and consider the following explanatory variables for our model: 
Lagged changes in public revenue (in percent of GDP): the inclusion of this 
variable in the model aims at capturing a sort of ‘state-dependence’. We expect an increase of 
                                                          
3
 See the easy estimation method of Jenkins (1995) and also Jenkins (2005). 
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the public revenue to-GDP ratio to reduce the likelihood of expansion spells ending, whereas 
the opposite effect may be obtained for the probability of contraction spells terminating.  
Real GDP growth: this variable is introduced in the model with one year lagged 
values to avoid simultaneity problems. The effect of real GDP growth is ambiguous. Indeed, 
there is a largely unanimous view among both neoclassical and Keynesian economists, as well 
as among policymakers for countercyclical fiscal policies, as optimal fiscal policy. In line 
with that view, we expect real GDP growth to reduce the likelihood of government revenue 
expansion terminating. However, as the empirical literature demonstrates by providing 
evidence of procyclical fiscal policies in developing countries, we may obtain an increase of 
the likelihood of expansion ending following a rise in real GDP growth. 
At the same time, either approaches suggest that, in good times, government revenue 
should increase and that the ratio should decline during bad times. Accordingly, a severe 
decline in output during bad times is expected to positively affect the probability of expansion 
ending as well as the likelihood of contraction termination. This suggests (with regard to an 
unchanged tax base) that public revenue is countercyclical.        
Growth rate of terms of trade: An increase of the terms of trade growth rate 
following an improvement of terms of trade should reduce the likelihood of the expansion 
duration ending and increase the probability of the duration of contraction being terminated.    
Number of previous expansions (contractions): We follow the method of Beck et 
al., (1998). These authors emphasize that, when dealing with binary time-series cross-section 
(BTSC) where the temporal dependence is modeled, ordinary logit or probit models may 
result in overly high inferences (t-statistics that are too high). To circumvent that bias, they 
suggest adding to the model a variable that picks up the number of previous spells of 
expansion or contraction of government revenues. This is in line with our intention to take 
into account the repeated nature of spells and thus to conform with the hypothesis that all 
spells should be independent and conditional on the covariates. As a result, we include in our 
specification the variables ‘numberexpansions’ and ‘numbercontractions’ that capture 
respectively the number of previous spells of government revenue expansions and the number 
of previous spells of government revenue contractions. We expect that the higher the number 
of previous spells of expansions, the lower the likelihood of expansion ending and, the higher 
the likelihood of previous contractions spells, the higher the probability of contraction 
duration ending. However, we can presume that after a long period of revenue expansion, the 
government will, for several reasons, adopt lax tax policies. In the same way, after several 
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periods of public revenue contraction, the government can decide to implement the 
appropriate measures to mobilize more revenue, measures which will stop the continuous 
period of contraction. Therefore, the expected effects may be the opposite of those mentioned 
above.  
The baseline hazard rate: The last regressor to be included in our model is the 
baseline hazard rate. As explained later, we can model this in the most flexible way by the use 
of dummy variables that enable the estimation of period-specific intercepts. Indeed, for spells 
of expansion, we can include dummies for each year up to the end of the seventh year (from 1 
year to 7 years) and an additional dummy for longer durations (here the maximum spell length 
is 9 years, but there is no spell length of 8 years). For spells of contractions that last from 1 to 
8 years, we also include dummies for each year up to the eighth year. Additionally, we have 
created two dummy variables to capture the effects of the recent financial crisis (that started in 
2008): dummy2008 and dummy2009 that take respectively ‘1’ for the years 2008 and 2009 
and, ‘0’ otherwise.  
 
4.2.2 The second challenge : The functional form of the baseline hazard rate 
The second challenge relates to the choice of the functional form of the hazard rate. 
We rely here on Hess et al. (2010). The most commonly encountered functional specifications 
(see. Hess et al., 2010) are the normal, logistic, and extreme-value minimum distribution, 
leading respectively to probit, logit or cloglog models. The logit and cloglog models are 
similar but differ in the fact that a discrete- time hazard model based on a cloglog assumes 
proportional hazards, whereas one based on a logit transformation assumes proportional odds 
(Singer and Willet 2003; Jenkins 2005). Note that the complementary log-log model can be 
interpreted as the discrete time counterpart of an underlying continuous-time proportional 
hazard model (see for e.g. Allison, 1982 and Jenkins (1995, 2005). By contrast, the probit 
specification is decidedly non-proportional (see also Sueyoski, 1995 for an extensive 
discussion of these model specifications in a duration context). In this paper, we implement 
the probit, logit and cloglog model and use some criteria described later to choose the model 
that fits our dataset better. 
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4.2.3 The third challenge: the choice of the functional form of the 
baseline hazard rate. 
The third challenge relates to the choice of the functional form of the baseline hazard 
rate. According to the literature, several forms of the baseline hazard rate exist (denoting here, 
tθ ) : a parametric form of the hazard rate (usually stipulated on the basis of a theoretical 
framework – for example the weibull model; a specification linear in time: 0 1t tθ α α= +  ; a 
polynomial in time: 20 1 2 .... ...t t tθ α α α= + + + +  ) and a non-parametric method to estimate the 
hazard rate (for example piece-wise dummies – one for each particular sub-period of time – 
where the hazard rate is assumed to be the same within each time-group but different between 
those groups: 0 1 1 2 2 .... ...t d dθ α α α= + + + +  ; or when it is possible, a fully non-parametric 
specification with one dummy for each value of t for which the event is reported).  
In this paper, as we do not have any theory that dictates the choice of the functional 
form of the baseline hazard rate (which characterizes the form of the duration dependence), 
we will model it in a flexible way by the use of a piecewise constant specification with a set 
of dummy variables for spells of expansions/contractions of government revenues, where the 
hazard rate is assumed to be the same within each country-spell but different between those 
spells. As the maximum duration of expansion is 9 years and that of contraction 8 years in the 
full sample of developing countries, we will proceed to the creation of the dummy variables 
as follows: a dummy duration-specific intercept is created for every possible duration from 1 
to d_max = 9 for expansions spells and d_max = 8 for contractions spells, where d_max is the 
maximum duration. Hence we have, in the absence of a constant in the model, 9 dummy 
variables for expansions and 8 dummy variables for contraction; in order to capture the 
duration dependence in expansion spells duration and the contraction spells duration.  
 
4.2.4 The fourth challenge : the issue of unobserved heterogeneity  
The fourth challenge calls for the choice of whether or not to include ‘unobserved 
country specific effects’ or ’frailty’ in the model. If these are included, the choice of the 
distribution of unobserved heterogeneity becomes crucial for the ‘frailty’ model. According to 
the empirical literature (see Jenkins 2005), ignorance of the heterogeneity effect could lead to 
three major biases: an overestimation of negative duration dependence; unstable coefficients 
for covariates and biases coefficients for covariates.  
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In the empirical literature, the Gamma and inverse Gaussian distributions are 
commonly used for continuous-time model whereas the Gamma Normal (Gaussian) 
distributions are used to represent the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity in discrete-
time model. In other words, when estimating discrete-time models, a sensible approach is to 
apply conventional binary response panel data models with random effects (see for e.g. 
Castro, 2010; Hess et al., 2010; Steele F. A., 2011). 
In this paper, we subscribe to the usual convention in estimating discrete-time models and 
assuming that the individual-specific unobserved characteristic (unobserved heterogeneity) 
follow a log-normal distribution (normally distributed with zero mean and independence of 
frailty with all observable characteristics): the individual-specific effects are modeled using 
random effects techniques. Hence, by the use of the maximum likelihood method, we estimate 
the parameters of the complementary-log-logistic, logit and probit models.  
      
5. EVALUATION OF THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, we will discuss the results obtained from the estimation of the baseline 
specification of explanatory variables using discrete-time cloglog, logit and probit models 
with random effects (In this way we can take account of unobserved individual heterogeneity 
or frailty). As mentioned above, the baseline hazard rate is modelled in the most flexible way 
by the use of dummy variables that enable the estimation of period-specific intercepts. In 
addition, we exclude all left-censored spells which could lead to misestimating the hazard 
rate. Given that we have several possible non-parametric models (cloglog, logit and probit 
models) we need a rule to discriminate between them in order to interpret our results. The 
empirical literature offers us a means to deal with that issue: when non-parametric models are 
nested, the likelihood ratio or the wald tests can be used to discriminate between them. 
Conversely, when they are not nested, these tests become unsuitable and make it difficult to 
choose one model for interpreting our results. In such a situation, a practical and common 
approach is to use the Akaike Information Criterion  
 (AIC): 2(log ) 2( 1)AIC likelihood c q= − + + +  where c is the number of model covariates 
(explanatory variables) and q is the number of model-specific auxiliary parameters. This 
information criterion is proposed by Akaike (1994) and penalizes each log-likelihood to 
reflect the number of parameters being estimated in a particular model and then comparing 
them.  
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Therefore, the preferred model would be the one with the smallest AIC value (which 
describes the data more accurately) despite the fact that the best-fitting model is the one with 
the largest log-likelihood. Accordingly, all the choices that will subsequently need to be made 
for the interpretation of the model’s results will rely on the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC). 
   In tables 4 and 5, we display the results of the estimation of the hazard rate, the latter 
picking respectively up the likelihood of termination of government revenue expansion 
duration and the likelihood of the termination of government revenue contractions duration. In 
these tables, both the duration dependence variables (the dummy variables) and the time-
varying explanatory variables are taken into account and the model uses discrete-time cloglog, 
logit and probit models with random effects to conduct estimates. 
The results of the duration dependence variables indicate evidence of positive duration 
dependence in expansions, except for the spell length of 1 year (see table 3). This means that 
in these countries, the likelihood of an expansion ending increases with age. In fact, duration 
dependence increases significantly for the spell length ranging from 2 to 5years, and this 
become statistically insignificant afterwards. Therefore, the probability of expansion spells 
ending increases if the country has experienced an expansion of its public revenue for up to 
five periods (years) and the spells that go beyond 5 years do not significantly affect the 
likelihood of termination of the government’s revenue expansion . An economic interpretation 
of such results may be that, on average, after 5 consecutive years of government revenue 
expansion, the governments of these countries need to conduct adequate policy measures 
(increasing the tax base and/or tax rate) to avoid the ending of that expansion.  
Government revenue contractions (table 4) also exhibit positive duration dependence 
from a 2-years spell length until the last spell (8-year spell length). with the exception of a 
spell length of 1 year which is not significant in explaining the hazard rate of contraction 
termination. This means that, except for the 1 year of spell length, the hazard rate of 
government revenue contraction increases with 2 years or more of contraction spells. Hence, 
after 1 year of spell length, the governments of these countries take ad-hoc policy measures to 
reverse the trend of contractions. Thus, the likelihood of expansions and contractions of 
government revenue occurring in these countries becomes more likely to end as years pass. 
This means that the likelihood of an expansion ending increases with age. These results 
remain valid for the two sub-samples. 
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The results in table 3 reveal that, for both the whole sample of developing countries 
and the sub-sample of SSA, the probit model appears to exhibit the smallest AIC criterion. 
Accordingly, we will rely on the probit model for interpreting the results stemming from the 
different model specifications (columns 3 and 6). The assumption is that the proportional 
hazard appears not to be valid for the group of the developing countries and the sub-group of 
SSA. However, for the sub-group of non sub-Saharan African countries, the logit model 
appears to exhibit the smallest AIC value. The results could thus be interpreted in terms of 
proportional log-odds of expansion spells ending and contraction spells terminating. It is 
worth mentioning that there is no spell length of 7 years for the sub-sample of SSA (the 
maximum spell length is 6 years) and no spell length of 9 years for the Non SSA (the 
maximum spell length is 7 years). In table 4, the same AIC criterion suggests the choice of the 
probit model whatever group we consider, for the interpretations of our results.  
The relative importance of the frailty (unobserved heterogeneity) is given by the 
estimates for ρ (rho) displayed in the tables 3 and 4. The “rho” is indeed the ratio of 
heterogeneity variance to one plus the heterogeneity variance and in a way this indicates how 
much of the model variance is due to unobserved heterogeneity: rho =
2
2
( _ )
1 ( _ )
sigma u
sigma u+
, where 
“sigma_u” is the standard deviation of the unobserved heterogeneity (this is the country-level 
random effect standard deviation). If the hypothesis that rho is zero cannot be rejected, then 
frailty is unimportant. The p-value of the likelihood ratio test associated with the rho is lower 
than 0.01 in all but one cases, suggesting the strong role played by frailty in all but one model 
specifications. The only case where the p-value is higher than 10% is that of expansion hazard 
rate (column 8 of the table 3) where we retain the logit model.  
 With regard to the results of the explanatory variables in tables 4 and 5, it is necessary 
to take simultaneity problems into account, along with the delay in processing some economic 
data. In order to identify their impact on our dependent variable, we include other explanatory 
variables with one-year lagged values: the public revenue, as a percentage of GDP; the growth 
rate of real GDP; and a dummy capturing bad times, which is calculated on the basis of one-
year lagged values of real GDP growth.  
The first regressor is the government revenue as a percentage of GDP. The results, 
whatever the sample considered, reveal that the coefficient associated with this variable 
presents a negative sign and has a strong power in anticipating the end of expansions and 
contractions. In other words, an increase in government revenue (as a percentage of GDP) 
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reduces the likelihood of government revenue expansion ending, whereas a decrease in this 
ratio increases the likelihood of the duration contraction termination.  The  growth rate of the 
terms of trade does not affect significantly the likelihood of government revenue expansion 
ending. A decrease in the growth rate of real GDP is associated with an increase in the 
probability of the expansion ending, whatever the sample considered. This is suggestive of the 
countercyclical nature of government revenue during its phases of expansion, if we suppose 
the tax base will remain unchanged. In addition, the higher the number of previous spells of 
expansion, the lower the likelihood of the expansion terminating. Columns (3), (6) and (9) of 
table 4 suggest the following:  
- A positive growth rate of terms of trade induces a higher likelihood of contraction 
duration ending. This is in the line with our theoretical expectations.  
- For the whole sample and the sub-sample of SSA Countries, an increase in the real 
GDP growth rate negatively affects the probability of contraction termination. This 
means that public revenue will be procyclical during its phases of contractions. For 
non SSA countries, the hazard rate of contractions is not significantly associated 
with the growth rate of real GDP.  
- The number of previous spells appears to exert a negative effect on the likelihood 
of government revenue contraction termination for the whole sample of developing 
countries, but not for the sub-samples., where the effect is statistically 
insignificant.  
        Does the hazard rate of government revenue expansions/contractions behave differently 
during bad times and good times? 
The results of table 3 show that the probability of expansion ending is lower in bad 
times than in good times, whereas a decline in real GDP growth rate during the bad times 
reduces that probability. This reflects a procyclicality of government revenue expansion 
phases during bad times, with regard to an unchanged tax base. Furthermore, the probability 
of contraction ending also appears to be negatively affected by a decline in real GDP growth 
rate during bad times. Phases of revenue contractions appear to be countercyclical (for a fixed 
tax base).        
In table 4, we can see that the behaviour of the hazard rate of government revenue 
contraction is not statistically different in good times and bad times for the sample of all the 
developing countries and for the sub-sample of SSA countries but not for non SSA countries, 
where the likelihood of contraction terminating is lower in bad times than in good times. By 
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contrast, for the sample of all developing countries and for the sub-sample of SSA countries, 
we can find evidence that an increase of the real GDP growth during bad times induces a 
higher probability of contraction termination, while a rise in the real GDP growth during bad 
times is not significantly associated with the likelihood of a contract ending. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The literature on government revenue has usually focused either on the determinants of 
tax (or total) revenue or on its effects on macroeconomic indicators such as economic growth, 
private consumption and investment. This paper departs from the previous by attempting to 
explore by introducing hazard analysis in government revenue dynamic analysis. More 
particularly, we use an unbalanced panel of public revenue data on 68 developing countries 
(of which, 42 sub-Saharan Africans) over the period 1980-2009, to examine whether 
government revenue expansion and contraction phases exhibit duration dependence. The 
analysis covers both the full sample of developing countries and the sub-samples of sub-
Saharan African and Non sub-Saharan African countries.      
The following main conclusions emerge from our study: 
• Government revenue expansion and contraction appear to exhibit positive duration 
dependence. 
• An increase in public revenue in year t compare of that of year t-1 reduces the 
probability of government revenue expansion ending and that of contraction 
termination.  
• Terms of trade growth affects positively and significantly hazard rate of 
contraction and does not affect significantly the hazard rate of expansion. 
• The expansions of government revenue appear to be countercyclical and the 
contractions of government revenue, procyclical, even during bad times.  
Summarizing all these results, we conclude that when taking account of frailty, not 
only the duration of government revenue expansion and contraction are affected by several 
economic variables, but they are also affected by the actual age of expansion and contraction.  
Regarding precisely the duration dependence aspect, our analysis suggests interest 
results. On the side of contraction, we obtain that the higher the duration of contraction, the 
higher its likelihood of ending, suggesting that governments in developing countries, after 1 
year of contraction of their public revenue, start finding adequate measures to stop that 
contraction trend. By contrast, on the expansion side, the probability of expansion ending 
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increases with the length of the expansion lasting from 2 years to 5 years. However, after 5 
years, the effect is statistically insignificant on the hazard rate of expansion. This may suggest 
that the governments in developing countries adopt lax tax policies after 1 year and until 5 
years of expansion of public revenue.    
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Appendix 1: Variables - Definitions and sources 
Variable Definition Source Comments 
    
Lagrevenuegdp 
The one-year lagged 
values of the total 
government revenue 
(excluding grants), 
expressed in 
percentage of GDP. 
The government revenue data stem from the Public Finance 
Database of CERDI (Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le 
Developpement International) - France 
Author’s calculation of the one-year lagged values of the 
total government revenue (excluding grants), expressed in 
percentage of GDP. 
Growthterms 
The growth rate of the 
net barters terms of 
trade (in percentage 
change). 
The net barters terms of trade of the World Bank Development 
Indicators (2011). 
Author’s calculation of the growth rate the net barters terms 
of trade. 
Lagrealgrowth 
The one-year lagged 
values of the real GDP 
growth rate. 
The real GDP growth rate data come from the World Bank 
Development Indicators (2011). 
Author’s calculation of the one-year lagged values of the 
real GDP growth rate. 
Badtimes 
This variable 
describes the “bad 
times” during the 
considered period of 
study. 
The real GDP growth rate data stem from the World Bank 
Development Indicators (2011). 
Author’s calculation: this variable is computed as the years 
where one year lagged GDP Growth rate is lower or equal 
to "the average of one year Lagged GDP Growth rate less 
than one standard deviation". 
Badtimesrealgrowth 
This variable captures 
the value of the one 
year lagged real GDP 
growth rate during 
bad times. 
The real GDP growth rate data stem from the World Bank 
Development Indicators (2011). 
Author’s calculation: this variable is computed as the 
combination of the previously computed variables 
“badtimes” and “ realgrowthreta”. 
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Appendix 2: The Different lists of Countries 
 
List of countries of the sample of Developing countries 
Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo Dem. Rep., Congo Rep., Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt Arab Rep., El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Islamic Rep., Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Rwanda, 
Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Uganda, Yemen Rep., Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
List of countries of the sub-sample of Sub-Saharan African countries 
Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., 
Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia,  Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
Numberexpansions The number of prior 
spells of expansions. 
Author’s calculation based on the data of Public Finance 
Database of CERDI as well as on the criteria used in Cashin 
(2004), and described above. 
Consider the variable “expansion” that describes for a given 
country, the spells of expansions. That variable takes the 
value “1” for all expansion’ spells and “0”, otherwise. The 
variable “numberexpansions” that captures the number of 
previous spells of expansions takes the value “0” for the 
first spell and then “1” for the following spell, “2” for the 
third spell, and so one…   
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Table 1: Summary Statistics on the distribution of Government Revenue Expansions and Contractions Spells 
 
Country Name Period of Data Covering 
Number of 
Expansions' 
Spells1  
Mean 
Expansions 
Std Deviation 
Expansions 
Min 
Expansions 
Max 
Expansions 
Number of 
Contractions' 
Spells1  
Mean 
Contractions 
Std 
Deviation 
Contractions 
Min 
Contractions 
Max 
Contractions 
Argentina 1980-2005 5 2.6 1.67332 1 5 4 1.75           .5 1 2 
Bahrain 1980-2007 7 1.857143 .6900656 1 3 8 1.625     .5175492  1 2 
Bangladesh 1980-2009 5 1.6 .8944272 1 3 6  1.333333     .5163978 1 2 
Belize 1980-2009 6 1.833333 .7527727 1 3 7  1.714286    1.112697  1 4 
Benin 1980-2009 7 2.142857 1.069045 1 4 6 1.833333    .7527727 1 3 
Bhutan 1980-2009 4 3.25 .9574271 2 4 5  1.8      1.30384 1 4 
Bolivia 1980-2009 5 3.2 1.30384 2 5 5 1.6     1.341641 1 4 
Botswana 1980-2009 8 2 .9258201 1 4 8 1.5    .9258201 1 3 
Brazil 1980-2008 6 2.833333 1.834848 1 5 5 1.4   .8944272 1 3 
Burkina Faso 1980-2009 7 2.428571 1.397276 1 5 6  1.5      .83666 1 3 
Burundi 1980-2009 6 2.166667 1.602082 1 5 7 1.571429   .9759001 1 3 
Cameroon 1980-2009 6 1.666667 .8164966 1 3 8 1.75     1.752549 1 6 
Cape Verde 1980-2009 7 2.428571 1.511858 1 5 6 1.333333    .8164966 1 3 
Central 1980-2009 6 1.5 .5477226 1 2 5 1.8   .83666 1 3 
Chad 1980-2009 7 2.285714 1.496026 1 5 5  1.4    .5477226 1 2 
Chile 1980-2009 5 2 1.224745 1 4 4  2.5  1.732051 1 5 
Colombia 1980-2009 7 2.142857 1.214986 1 4 4  1.25      .5 1 2 
Comoros 1980-2008 7 1.428571 .5345225 1 2 8  1.625   .5175492 1 2 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 
1980-2009 8 2 1.414214 1 5 6 1.333333   .5163978 1 2 
Congo, Rep. 1980-2008 7 2 1.290994 1 4 7 1.285714    .48795 1 2 
Costa Rica 1980-2008 5 2.8 1.30384 1 4 4  1.5  1 1 3 
Cote d'Ivoire 1980-2009 4 2 .8164966 1 3 5 2.4    2.19089 1 6 
Djibouti 1980-2008 5 1.8 .83666 1 3 6  2.5   1.048809 1 4 
Dominican 1980-2009 5 3 2.54951 1 7 5 2 .7071068 1 3 
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Ecuador 1980-2007 7 1.714286 .7559289 1 3 6  1.5     .83666 1 3 
Egypt, Arab 1980-2009 3 2.333333 .5773503 2 3 6 2.833333   2.857738 1 7 
El Salvador 1980-2009 4 3.75 2.217356 1 6 4   2.25   .9574271 1 3 
Ethiopia 1980-2009 4 2.25 1.5 1 4 4 3 2.708013 1 7 
Gabon 1980-2009 8 1.875 .6408699 1 3 8  1.5   .7559289 1 3 
Gambia, The 1980-2009 9 1.333333 .7071068 1 3 9 1.444444   .7264832 1 3 
Ghana 1980-2009 9 1.777778 1.092906 1 4 6 1.166667   .4082483 1 2 
Guinea 1980-2009 5 2.6 1.81659 1 5 5 2.2   1.643168 1 4 
Guinea-Bissau 1980-2009 7 1.571429 .7867958 1 3 6  2.333333   .8164966 1 3 
Iran, Islamic 1980-2009 6 2 1.549193 1 5 7  1.714286   1.112697 1 4 
Jordan 1980-2009 6 2.333333 1.75119 1 5 7 1.714286    .7559289 1 3 
Kenya 1980-2009 6 2 1.264911 2 4 6  1.333333   .8164966 1 3 
Lesotho 1980-2009 6 2.833333 .9831921 1 4 4 2 .8164966 1 3 
Madagascar 1980-2007 5 2.2 2.167948 1 6 6 1.666667   .5163978 1 2 
Malawi 1980-2009 8 1.75 .8864053 1 3 6 1.833333   .4082483 1 2 
Maldives 1980-2009 7 2.142857 1.214986 1 4 7 1.428571   .5345225 1 2 
Mali 1980-2009 5 2.2 1.643168 1 5 4  2.25   .9574271 1 3 
Mauritania 1980-2009 7 1.428571 .5345225 1 2 7 2 .8164966 1 3 
Mauritius 1980-2009 5 1.6 .8944272 1 3 6  1.833333  .7527727 1 3 
Mexico 1980-2008 2 3 0 3 3 4  3.75   1.707825 2 6 
Morocco 1980-2008 5 3.2 1.643168 1 5 5 2.2   1.643168 1 5 
Mozambique 1980-2009 5 2.2 1.643168 1 5 6  1.666667   .8164966 1 3 
Namibia 1980-2009 8 2 1.511858 1 5 9  1.333333   .7071068 1 3 
Niger 1980-2009 5 2.4 1.341641 1 4 5 2 1.732051 1 5 
Nigeria 1980-2009 5 2 1 1 3 8  1.5   .7559289 1 3 
Pakistan 1980-2009 6 1.666667 .8164966 1 3 10  1.3    .6749486 1 3 
Peru 1980-2009 4 3.25 1.258306 2 5 6 1.333333  .5163978 1 2 
Rwanda 1980-2009 6 2.666667 1.36626 1 5 5 2 1 1 3 
Sao Tome and 1980-2009 8 1.625 .7440238 1 3 7 1.857143   .6900656 1 3 
Senegal 1980-2009 7 2 1.414214 1 4 5 2 1 1 3 
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Sierra Leone 1980-2009 6 2.166667 .9831921 1 3 7  1.571429   .5345225 1 2 
South Africa 1980-2009 5 2  1 3 6  1.5     .83666 1 3 
Sri Lanka 1980-2009 5 1.4 .7071068 1 2 7 2 1.527525 1 5 
Sudan 1980-2009 5 2.8     .5477226 1 9 7  1.857143   .8997354 1 3 
Swaziland 1980-2009 8 1.5 .7559289 1 3 8  1.75    .8864053 1 3 
Syrian Arab 1980-2008 9 1.444444 .8819171 1 3 6  1.5     .5477226 1 2 
Tanzania 1980-2009 7 2 1.154701 1 4 5 1.4    .5477226 1 2 
Togo 1980-2009 7 1.571429 .7867958 1 3 6  2.5    2.738613 1 8 
Tunisia 1980-2009 4 1.5 1 1 3 8  1.875    1.246423 1 4 
Turkey 1980-2009 4 4.25 2.217356 2 7 5 2 .7071068 1 3 
Uganda 1980-2009 5 3.6 3.286335 1 9 3 1.666667    1.154701 1 3 
Yemen, Rep. 1980-2009 6 2 1.095445 1 3 7  2.285714   2.21467 1 7 
Zambia 1980-2009 7 1.142857 .3779645 1 2 8  2.125    .834523 1 3 
Zimbabwe 1980-2009 6 1.333333 .5163978 1 2 7 2.142857   2.035401 1 6 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis - *p-value<0,1; **p-value<0,05; ***p-value<0,01. 
1: Spurious points and Left Censoring Spells are excluded.  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on the censoring status of the duration of government revenue expansions and contractions 
 
 
For the full sample of Developing 
countries 
For the full sample of Sub-Saharan 
African countries 
For the full sample of non Sub-Saharan 
African countries 
 Sample Mean Standard Deviation Sample Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Sample Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Complete Expansions Spells 47 6,06 1,49 28 6,46 1,43 19 5,47 1,42 
Ongoing  (Incomplete) 
Expansions Spells 
21 5,81 1,40 14 6,29 1,07 7 4,86 1,57 
Complete and Ongoing 
Expansions Spells 
68 5,99 1,46 42 6,40 1,31 26 5,31 1,46 
          
Complete Contractions 
Spells 
34 5,68 1,36 24 6 1,38 10 4,9 0,99 
Ongoing  (Incomplete) 
Contractions Spells 
34 6,5 1,44 18 6,56 1,38 16 6,44 1,55 
Complete and Ongoing 
Contractions Spells 
68 6,09 1,45 42 6,24 1,39 26 5,85 1,54 
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Figure 1: Descriptive Survivor Functions of government revenue expansions and contractions’ duration in developing countries  
 
 
Figure 2: Descriptive Survivor Functions of government revenue expansions and contractions’ duration in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) and Non 
Sub-Saharan African countries (Non SSA) 
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Table 3: Estimation of the hazard rate of government revenues expansions (Revenue–to-GDP ratio) using the Complementary Log-Logistic 
(Cloglog), Logistic and Probit functional forms with random effects. 
 All Developing Countries Sub-Saharan African Countries Non Sub-Saharan African Countries 
 RE 
Cloglog 
RE Logit RE 
Probit 
RE 
Cloglog 
RE Logit RE 
Probit 
RE Cloglog RE Logit RE Probit 
Variables          
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Lagrevenuegdp -0.0685*** -0.0671*** -0.0382*** -0.0684*** -0.0658*** -0.0376*** -0.0737*** -0.0725*** -0.0429*** 
 
(0.00899) (0.00915) (0.00520) (0.0108) (0.0110) (0.00618) (0.0170) (0.0174) (0.0104) 
Growthterms -0.000124 0.00145 0.00193 0.00364 0.00746 0.00574 -0.00852 -0.00959 -0.00562 
 
(0.00469) (0.00629) (0.00353) (0.00557) (0.00762) (0.00422) (0.00984) (0.0114) (0.00658) 
 lagrealgrowth -0.0782*** -0.118*** -0.0619*** -0.0748*** -0.111*** -0.0617*** -0.123*** -0.182*** -0.0864*** 
 
(0.0224) (0.0283) (0.0155) (0.0259) (0.0330) (0.0182) (0.0445) (0.0577) (0.0309) 
Badtimesrealgrowth 0.189** 0.253*** 0.128** 0.237* 0.322** 0.176** 0.204 0.264* 0.123 
 
(0.0846) (0.0974) (0.0501) (0.130) (0.154) (0.0824) (0.126) (0.142) (0.0784) 
Badtimes -1.561*** -2.029*** -1.121*** -1.679*** -2.146*** -1.212*** -1.504** -2.057*** -1.090*** 
 
(0.368) (0.417) (0.229) (0.449) (0.510) (0.278) (0.646) (0.748) (0.418) 
numberexpansions -0.231*** -0.307*** -0.168*** -0.257*** -0.349*** -0.195*** -0.167* -0.192** -0.0963* 
 
(0.0406) (0.0489) (0.0275) (0.0485) (0.0586) (0.0330) (0.0853) (0.0958) (0.0557) 
durexp1year 11.20 27.91 10.29 11.72 25.54 10.56 9.168 23.90 8.038 
 
(1050) (12283) (3516) (188.8) (2506) (586.8) (5999) (4565) (433.0) 
durexp2year 2.363*** 3.166*** 1.829*** 2.514*** 3.333*** 1.934*** 2.224*** 3.039*** 1.747*** 
 
(0.196) (0.248) (0.137) (0.249) (0.311) (0.171) (0.342) (0.450) (0.248) 
durexp3year 1.862*** 2.360*** 1.361*** 1.980*** 2.519*** 1.463*** 1.782*** 2.185*** 1.266*** 
 
(0.213) (0.252) (0.140) (0.284) (0.331) (0.183) (0.349) (0.422) (0.230) 
durexp4year 1.555*** 2.011*** 1.189*** 1.434*** 1.884*** 1.112*** 1.859*** 2.300*** 1.339*** 
 
(0.272) (0.317) (0.179) (0.360) (0.417) (0.234) (0.427) (0.487) (0.278) 
durexp5year 1.435*** 1.660*** 0.944*** 1.742*** 2.022*** 1.160*** 1.098** 1.235** 0.741** 
 
(0.318) (0.361) (0.202) (0.421) (0.487) (0.276) (0.506) (0.563) (0.304) 
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durexp6year 0.590 0.686 0.466 0.432 0.646 0.430 0.655 0.549 0.478 
 
(0.817) (0.887) (0.494) (1.162) (1.252) (0.697) (1.145) (1.289) (0.693) 
durexp7year 0.694 0.694 0.666 0 0 0 0.651 0.616 0.581 
 
(0.820) (0.918) (0.473) (0) (0) (0) (0.840) (0.921) (0.488) 
durexp9year -0.209 0.00425 0.112 -0.206 -0.00121 0.108 - - - 
 
(0.825) (0.871) (0.459) (0.841) (0.888) (0.467) - - - 
dummy2008 1.170*** 1.747*** 1.002*** 0.676 1.075* 0.681** 2.325*** 2.739*** 1.510*** 
 
(0.334) (0.422) (0.224) (0.440) (0.556) (0.294) (0.531) (0.634) (0.362) 
dummy2009 1.754*** 1.962*** 1.055*** 2.133*** 2.475*** 1.381*** 0.337 0.290 0.0644 
 
(0.376) (0.463) (0.267) (0.436) (0.554) (0.323) (1.064) (1.160) (0.651) 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Observations - Countries 1623-67 1623-67 1623-67 1051-41 1051-41 1051-41 572-26 572-26 572-26 
NonZero Outcomes 208   137   71   
Log Likelihood -528.96057 -498.56226 -498.07833 -332.55732 -312.67934 -311.10222 -188.06252 -177.83785 -178.83182 
Wald Chi2 312.94 309.12 346.26 198.81 195.88 221.11 123.14 124.34 135.70 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC 1091.921 1031.125 1030.157 697.1146 657.3587 654.2044 408.125 387.6757 389.6636 
sigma_u .8580799 .6599161 .4499451 .8880914 .6939827 .4529634 .6632685 .3729162 .3446748 
 
(.1880346) (.1746644) (.1016043) (.2479229) (.2104713) (.1245927) (.279217) (.3787607) (.1703963) 
Rho .3092097 .1168986 .168365 .324085 .1276984 .1702456 .2110095 .0405568 .1061858 
 
(.0936137) (.0546469) (.0632364) (.1223038) (.0675657) (.0777114) (.1401704) (.0790435) (.0938414) 
LR associated to Rho 29.12 8.95 16.82 22.38 7.64 11.95 4.93 0.36 2.20 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.013) (0.274) (0.069) 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis - *p-value<0,1; **p-value<0,05; ***p-value<0,01. 
“-“ means not available. 
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Table 4: Estimation of the hazard rate of Government Revenue Contractions (revenues –to-GDP ratio) using the Complementary Log-Logistic 
(Cloglog), Logistic and Probit functional forms with random effects (with control variables). 
 All Developing Countries Sub-Saharan Africa Countries Non Sub-Saharan African Countries 
 RE 
Cloglog 
RE Logit RE 
Probit 
RE 
Cloglog 
RE Logit RE 
Probit 
RE Cloglog RE Logit RE Probit 
Variables          
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Lagrevenuegdp -0.195*** -0.198*** -0.108*** -0.214*** -0.217*** -0.116*** -0.196*** -0.206*** -0.114*** 
 
(0.0198) (0.0228) (0.0120) (0.0281) (0.0324) (0.0167) (0.0318) (0.0375) (0.0206) 
Growthterms 0.0174*** 0.0199** 0.0107** 0.0143* 0.0171* 0.00955* 0.0293** 0.0326** 0.0163* 
 
(0.00658) (0.00815) (0.00459) (0.00768) (0.00954) (0.00537) (0.0127) (0.0157) (0.00914) 
Lagrealgrowth -0.0910*** -0.119*** -0.0615*** -0.110*** -0.138*** -0.0737*** -0.0407 -0.0764 -0.0338 
 
(0.0285) (0.0368) (0.0207) (0.0342) (0.0436) (0.0243) (0.0696) (0.0864) (0.0485) 
badtimesrealgrowth 0.112** 0.143** 0.0750* 0.197*** 0.241*** 0.129** -0.0876 -0.103 -0.0710 
 
(0.0547) (0.0716) (0.0396) (0.0724) (0.0936) (0.0530) (0.136) (0.179) (0.100) 
badtimes -0.375 -0.503 -0.277 0.0600 0.0881 0.0255 -1.367* -1.934** -1.041* 
 
(0.327) (0.420) (0.237) (0.400) (0.528) (0.298) (0.804) (0.970) (0.541) 
numbercontractions -0.118** -0.135* -0.0732* -0.119* -0.138 -0.0820 -0.0517 -0.0243 0.00173 
 
(0.0570) (0.0728) (0.0409) (0.0676) (0.0875) (0.0499) (0.120) (0.147) (0.0819) 
durcont1year 19.57 32.13 14.15 21.52 35.87 14.87 13.28 28.17 10.38 
 
(323.4) (5000) (2975) (543.6) (15940) (3214) (373.4) (6934) (778.2) 
durcont2year 4.550*** 5.249*** 2.887*** 4.858*** 5.562*** 3.027*** 4.317*** 5.092*** 2.810*** 
 
(0.387) (0.448) (0.230) (0.544) (0.623) (0.312) (0.579) (0.692) (0.372) 
durcont3year 4.071*** 4.562*** 2.506*** 4.385*** 4.874*** 2.640*** 3.828*** 4.473*** 2.509*** 
 
(0.423) (0.485) (0.252) (0.595) (0.671) (0.336) (0.660) (0.798) (0.444) 
durcont4year 3.321*** 3.590*** 1.925*** 2.415** 2.571* 1.349* 3.400*** 3.801*** 1.973*** 
 
(0.702) (0.802) (0.441) (1.169) (1.340) (0.738) (0.853) (0.987) (0.557) 
durcont5year 3.126*** 3.511*** 1.950*** 2.597* 2.512 1.305 3.447*** 4.124*** 2.301*** 
 
(0.748) (0.881) (0.473) (1.346) (1.634) (0.884) (0.944) (1.119) (0.631) 
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durcont6year 3.725*** 3.969*** 2.155*** 4.338*** 4.604*** 2.457*** 3.634*** 4.030*** 2.094*** 
 
(0.736) (0.836) (0.453) (1.063) (1.248) (0.667) (1.084) (1.209) (0.667) 
durcont7year 2.917*** 3.140** 1.669** 2.382* 2.369 1.161 4.432*** 5.072*** 2.724*** 
 
(1.085) (1.244) (0.681) (1.443) (1.779) (0.990) (1.542) (1.815) (1.056) 
durcont8year 3.381*** 3.435** 1.878** 3.626*** 3.674** 1.929** - - - 
 
(1.271) (1.512) (0.810) (1.362) (1.629) (0.872) - - - 
dummy2008 0.965** 1.070* 0.642** 1.092** 1.281* 0.778** 0.627 0.675 0.404 
 
(0.429) (0.558) (0.308) (0.544) (0.715) (0.395) (0.716) (0.923) (0.496) 
dummy2009 2.569*** 2.846*** 1.519*** 2.484*** 2.768*** 1.479*** 3.111*** 3.376*** 1.843*** 
 
(0.523) (0.635) (0.354) (0.667) (0.806) (0.445) (1.038) (1.210) (0.689) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
Observations - Countries 1627-67 1627-67 1627-67 1058-41 1058-41 1051-41 569-26 569-26 569-26 
NonZero Outcomes 167  
 
112  
 
55  
 
Log Likelihood -338.55063 -329.66517 -327.37578 -218.82568 -213.08429 -211.39105 -111.91304 -108.77807 -108.65894 
Wald Chi2 189.56 182.87 211.84 110.54 106.88 126.96 81.20 76.24 83.66 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC 711.1013 693.3303 688.7516 471.6514 460.1686 456.7821 255.8261 249.5561 249.3179 
sigma_u 1.473676 1.432029 .8297128 1.661944 1.616547 .8817608 1.118198 1.062284 .7110873 
 (.2313097) (.2659272) (.1433496) (.3152663) (.3614349) (.1876538) (.3403955) (.4090395) (.2401979) 
rho .5690117 .3839861 .4077315 .6267444 .4426873 .4374128 .4318607 .2554023 .3358329 
 (.0769854) (.0878511) (.0834433) (.088754) (.1103234) (.1047413) (.1493804) (.1464539) (.1506874) 
LR associated to Rho 70.77 34.40 40.35 50.92 24.29 27.75 14.18 6.16 8.88 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.001) 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis - *p-value<0,1; **p-value<0,05; ***p-value<0,01. 
“-“ means not available. 
 
 
